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Question 
Which sectors that employ fossil fuels are considered to be difficult to decarbonise due to 
technology availability, cost of large-scale deployment or feasibility of deployment in a 
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Achieving the goal of limiting global warming as set out in the Paris Agreement will require large 
reductions in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. All economic sectors will need to work towards 
achieving net zero emissions of CO2 and reduce emissions of other greenhouse gases such as 
methane (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 15; Fay et al., 2015, p. 1). 
The Energy Transitions Commission, led by commissioners from industry, academia, civil 
society, government, and intergovernmental agencies, asserts that it is technically possible to 
decarbonise the economy by mid-century through a combination of measures including more 
efficient use of materials, increasing re-use and recycling of materials, improving energy 
efficiency, using alternative fuels and technologies, electrification of industrial processes, use of 
biomass for heat, and carbon capture and storage (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, pp. 
16–17).  
The World Bank similarly asserts that there is ‘full consensus’ that decarbonisation requires, and 
can be achieved by decarbonised electricity production; electrification using low-carbon 
electricity, or switching to cleaner fuels where electrification is not possible; improved efficiency 
and reduced waste in all sectors; and preserving and increasing carbon sinks such as forests 
and other vegetation and soils (Fay et al., 2015, pp. 27–28). 
Some sectors are considered to be, from a technological standpoint, relatively easy and cost-
effective to decarbonise using known technologies. These sectors include light-duty 
transportation, heating, cooling, and lighting, rail, pulp and paper, aluminium, buildings, 
agriculture, and fishing, and to a large degree the electricity-generating sector (Davis et al., 2018, 
p. 1; Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 11). In the electricity generation and personal 
transportation sectors, low-carbon technologies are already sufficiently competitive, or nearly 
competitive, with older technologies that the low-carbon transition has developed its own 
momentum (Spencer & Mathur, 2019, p. 1). 
Other sectors, particularly in heavy industry and heavy transport, are considered more difficult to 
decarbonise, and are particularly relevant for developing countries which have large material and 
freight transport needs (Spencer & Mathur, 2019, p. 1). Globally, the sectors most often identified 
as difficult to decarbonise are aviation, long-distance road freight transport, shipping, cement, 
steel, plastics, and generating electricity that can respond rapidly to changing demand and 
compensate for the intermittency of energy sources like solar and wind power (Davis et al., 2018, 
p. 1; Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b). CO2 emissions from the most difficult-to-
decarbonise sectors account for 25% to 30% of global emissions, and current trends suggest 
that these emissions are likely to increase substantially in the future, and to account for a 
growing proportion of global emissions as other sectors decarbonise (Davis et al., 2018, p. 7; 
Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 15). 
This report focuses on eight sectors or issues that have been identified as having particular 
relevance to developing countries: cement, steel, captive coal, shipping, road freight, railway 
electrification, and electricity generation in centralised grids and in decentralised situations. It 
briefly describes each sector and identifies technologies that have some potential for use in 
decarbonising these difficult sectors. It is important to also recognise that decarbonisation is a 
contentious and highly political challenge, and that institutional and governance issues, which are 
not the focus of this report, will be critically important in any transition. 
3 
Source: Author’s own 
Sector Promising technologies 
Cement Demand reduction (building design, recycling, reuse) 
Changing composition (clinker-cement ratio, alternative 
formulations) 
Switching from coal to gas 
Carbon capture and storage 
Steel Increased scrap recycling  
Demand reduction through improved design 
Recovery and use of waste heat and gases 
Coke dry quenching 
Increasing reliance on electric arc furnaces, especially with low-
carbon electricity 
Direct reduced iron (DRI) and electric arc furnaces, especially 
hydrogen DRI 
Carbon capture and storage 
Captive coal Industry-dependent 
Shipping Slow steaming 
Ship design, drag reduction, and energy efficiency 
Wind assistance 
Ammonia and hydrogen fuels, if produced using low-carbon 
electricity 
Road freight Electric vehicles 
Shifting traffic to rail  
Vehicle energy efficiency 
Freight system optimisation 
Railway electrification Overhead line electrification on high-traffic lines only 
Electricity generation:  
electrical grids 
Solar and wind power 
Natural gas with carbon capture and storage 
Hydropower 
Pumped-hydro storage 
Compressed air storage 
Electricity generation:  
backup generation and 
mini-grids 
Mini-grids with solar photovoltaic (PV)1 and battery storage 
                                                   
1 Solar panels that generate electricity directly from sunlight.  
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2. Cement 
Cement is one of the ingredients used to make concrete, which is essential for building a wide 
range of types of infrastructure. ‘There is no other material currently available that is available in 
the quantities necessary to meet the demand for buildings and infrastructure. (International 
Energy Agency, 2018, p. 8). Demand for cement is currently flat in many high-income countries, 
and may decrease from the current extremely high levels in China which has undergone a long 
construction boom, but rapid growth is likely in India, Southeast Asia and Africa (Energy 
Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 55). Annual cement production in Africa is expected to more 
than treble from 2014 to 2050 (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 56). 
Cement is manufactured from naturally-occurring rocks that contain calcium carbonate, such as 
limestone, marl, or chalk, mixed with smaller quantities of other materials, which are quarried, 
crushed, and heated to undergo chemical reactions at temperatures up to 1450 °C. The process 
requires energy to transport the heavy minerals, operate crushing and grinding equipment, and 
create the high heat necessary for chemical reactions in the cement kilns (International Energy 
Agency, 2018, pp. 12–14). Typically, 30-40% of direct CO2 emissions come from the combustion 
of fuels, and 60-70% come from the chemical reactions that take place during the cement-
making process to convert limestone to calcium oxide (International Energy Agency, 2018, p. 
12). While it may be possible to substitute some of the energy inputs with low-carbon energy 
sources, the chemical reactions that release CO2 are a fundamental part of the production 
process and are more difficult to eliminate.  
Technology and processes in the cement industry are relatively slow to change. Furthermore, the 
infrastructure and equipment used in cement manufacture has a long lifetime – cement kilns may 
operate without fundamental retrofit for 30 to 40 years – making replacement of equipment a 
long-term affair (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 66). 
Energy efficiency measures such as using raw materials with a lower moisture content in dry-
process kilns, using preheating systems called precalciners to prepare incoming raw materials, 
using more efficient grinding and milling technologies, recovering and re-using waste heat in the 
production process, and improving control systems could reduce industry CO2 emissions. 
However, these reductions are small: the International Energy Agency (IEA)’s scenarios for 
emissions reductions in the cement industry suggest that these measures might only contribute 
3% of the reductions that would be needed to limit average global warming to 2 °C.2  Capital 
costs of retrofitting equipment can be high, new operating procedures and retraining would be 
required, and the feasibility and effectiveness of measures can vary depending the local raw 
materials available and local market requirements (International Energy Agency, 2018, pp. 23–
28). 
Alternative fuels could offer moderate reductions of CO2 emissions (12% of the reductions 
needed by 2050 to achieve the IEA’s two-degree warming scenario). Globally, coal is currently 
                                                   
2 The International Energy Agency (IEA) has developed two scenarios for carbon emissions to 2050 in the global 
cement industry: a ‘reference technology scenario’ which takes into account energy consumption trends and 
national commitments to limit carbon emissions and improve energy efficiency, and a ‘two-degree scenario’ 
which is an ambitious pathway for the industry consistent with resulting in at least a 50% chance of limiting 
average global temperature rise to 2 °C by 2100 and implies CO2 emission reductions of around 60% from 
current levels by 2050. References to the scale of contribution of various approaches to decarbonisation in the 
IEA scenarios refer to the reductions in emissions that would be achieved by going from the reference scenario to 
the two-degree scenario. 
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used for 70% of the thermal energy used for cement production, and oil and gas contribute 24%, 
with only slightly more than 5% coming from alternatives (International Energy Agency, 2018, p. 
28). Switching from coal to gas could be a practical intermediate step, particularly if carbon 
capture systems could be used as well (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 67). Existing 
cement plants can be modified to burn a wide range of industrial and municipal waste products 
have potential to be used as a source of heat, but are less efficient than fossil fuels and require 
careful management of toxic combustion by-products (International Energy Agency, 2018, pp. 
28–31)  Biomass from agricultural products (wood, grass, and algae) could in principle be a 
source of energy but is not currently cost-effective for the cement industry (International Energy 
Agency, 2018, pp. 28–31).  
Changing the composition of cement could reduce carbon emissions substantially. Replacing 
a portion of the clinker, which normally makes up 90% of cement, with other materials could 
allow production of cement with as much as 37% less CO2 emissions by 2050 in the IEA’s two-
degree-warming scenario (International Energy Agency, 2018, p. 32).  Potential alternative 
materials include gypsum, natural volcanic materials (pozzolan), limestone, and industrial by-
products such as ground granulated blast furnace slag (a by-product of producing iron), fly ash (a 
by-product of burning coal), ash from agricultural residues, and silica fume (a by-product of silica 
and ferro-silica alloy production processes) (International Energy Agency, 2018, pp. 32–36). 
Current building standards around the world specify the blends of cement that are permissible, 
and any changes would have to be carefully tested at scale to ensure that there are no long-term 
adverse effects on the strength or durability of the resulting concrete (Davis et al., 2018, p. 5; 
International Energy Agency, 2018, p. 35). Feasibility of substitutes will vary from place to place 
depending on local availability of suitable materials (International Energy Agency, 2018, pp. 32–
36). 
Renewable power generation including wind, solar, and hydropower can be used to 
decarbonise electricity consumption for grinding and milling activities, although they are not 
practical to supply the high heat requirements of the cement-making process (International 
Energy Agency, 2018, p. 37) 
Reducing the demand for new cement and concrete through changes in building design could 
reduce the need for concrete by 34% (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 16). Recycling 
cement and concrete could further reduce demand by 34% by 2050 in a circular-economy 
scenario (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 58). There could also be opportunities to 
use timber, rather than concrete, in new construction, which would reduce carbon emissions and 
also provide a carbon sink. The key constraint on this is the available supply of timber: to replace 
25% of the concrete used each year with timber would require an increase of global forest cover 
of about 14% (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 58). 
Carbon capture and storage technologies could be retrofitted to existing cement kilns, but 
these are in the early stages of development, mostly still experimental, and are likely to be 
expensive. Chemical absorption is the most-proven technology, and has been used in other 
industries, but has only undergone limited testing in the cement industry (International Energy 
Agency, 2018, pp. 37–41) 
Electrification of kilns is not currently practical. Technologies for electric kilns are unlikely to be 
commercially feasible until the 2040s and would require complete replacement of existing kilns, 
which would be very expensive (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 66). 
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3. Steel 
Steel is an essential component for infrastructure and manufacturing around the world. In high-
income countries, the stock of steel typically stabilises at about 12-13 tonnes per capita; in 
China, it is over 5 tonnes per capita and growing fast; in India and Africa, it is less than 1 tonne 
per capita. China is the dominant steel producer in the world today, with nearly 50% of total 
global production, but future demand will be driven by India (the world’s second-largest producer) 
and Africa (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 55; Hall, Spencer, & Kumar, 2020, p. 24). 
Annual steel production in Africa is expected to increase by seven times from 2014 to 2050, and 
production in India to increase by more than five times (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, 
p. 56). 
Two methods of producing steel account for almost all production worldwide: the basic oxygen 
furnace, which is used to produce new steel from iron ore and accounts for 70.8% of global 
production, and the electric arc furnace, which is used to recycle existing steel and accounts for 
28.8% of production. In Africa, 28% of steel production is new steel produced in basic oxygen 
furnaces and 72% is recycled steel from electric arc furnaces; for Africa excluding Egypt and 
South Africa these proportions are 12% and 88% respectively (World Steel Association, 2019, p. 
10). The basic oxygen furnace process begins by mixing iron ore with coke (a purified form of 
carbon produced by crushing and heating coal), and burning the coke to produce temperatures 
of more than 2000 °C to melt the iron ore. Impurities are drawn off, and the resulting molten iron 
is then mixed with up to 30% scrap metal and oxygen is blown through it to convert the iron into 
steel. The electric arc furnace process uses scrap steel, possibly combined with direct reduced 
iron (iron produced by reacting iron ore with carbon monoxide and hydrogen from coal or natural 
gas) and melts this raw material by passing a very high-energy electrical current through it 
(British Steel, n.d.; World Coal Association, n.d.). 
Steel production is complex, with multiple steps and options. The process tends to be highly 
dependent on coal and/or gas for energy, for carrying out chemical reactions, or both. There are 
possibilities for reducing CO2 emissions at several points, some of which are interdependent (for 
example, recycling steel is highly effective if the electric arc furnaces that process the scrap 
metal can be powered by renewable energy sources, but less effective if they are powered by 
coal). The cost and feasibility of each approach varies depending on local conditions. The 
Energy Transitions Commission concludes that ‘the two main routes to decarbonisation will 
certainly be hydrogen-based reduction and carbon capture, combined with either storage or use 
(CCS/U), but the optimal decarbonization pathway will differ by location depending on local 
electricity prices, and CCS cost and feasibility’ (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018a, p. 2).  
Recycling steel is very effective because steel can be repeatedly recycled with no loss in its 
properties or performance (World Steel Association, 2020, p. 3). Steel already has a high 
recycling rate, with a global average of 83% of end-of-life steel being collected for recycling 
(Material Economics, 2018, p. 66). Recycling could be increased further if products were 
redesigned to facilitate disassembly and recycling and limit downgrading in the recycling process 
(Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 58). Although steel can be recycled indefinitely, 
scrap metal frequently contains a mix of materials, and impurities, particularly copper, means that 
the quality of recycled steel cannot be maintained, and can only be used where low quality 
standards can be accepted (Material Economics, 2018, p. 68). Recycled steel is processed in 
electric arc furnaces, which can be low-carbon if the electricity they use is generated from low-
carbon, especially renewable, sources (Davis et al., 2018, pp. 4–5). 
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Demand for steel could potentially be reduced by 38% globally by 2050 through reducing waste 
across the value chain, improving the recycling process, promoting re-use of steel-based 
products, reducing demand for cars, and optimising the design of products, buildings and 
infrastructure to use less steel (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, pp. 16, 58).  
Energy efficiency: There are multiple points across the steel-making process where energy 
efficiency could be improved without fundamentally changing the process. Coke dry quenching 
is a well-established way to recover heat from coke early in the production process and use the 
energy to generate electricity or for other purposes (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018a, p. 
12; Pardo et al., 2012, pp. 16–18). Recovery of waste heat and gases can take place at 
several points in the production process and can be used to generate electricity or used for other 
purposes in the production process. An EU study that examined twelve ‘best available 
technologies’ for steel production found that the greatest reduction in CO2 emissions was 
achieved through an on-site state-of-the-art power plant using waste heat and gases from the 
steel production process to produce electricity and steam (Pardo, Moya, & Vatopoulos, 2012, pp. 
16–18). Continuous casting is the process of rolling molten steel directly into desired forms 
instead of first casting the steel into ingots, as was previous practice. This reduces the energy 
needed for re-heating and rolling the steel, and reduces material losses (Pardo et al., 2012, pp. 
17–18). Energy efficiency measures could theoretically achieve up to 37% higher energy 
efficiency, but in practice retrofits of existing equipment are not always possible and many such 
improvements have high up-front capital costs that companies may not be able to afford, 
especially in developing countries (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018a, p. 12; Pardo et al., 
2012, pp. 16–18).  
Direct reduced iron: Electric arc furnaces are used to recycle scrap steel, but can also use 
direct reduced iron (DRI) as their input material, which enables them to produce new steel, 
replacing the coal-dependent coking process that feeds basic oxygen furnaces. DRI is currently 
produced through chemical reactions with gases derived from coal or natural gas; the latter 
produces significantly less carbon emissions than coke-based iron production (Energy 
Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 67). Hydrogen is perhaps the most promising candidate for a 
low-carbon replacement, as it could offer significant climate benefits if the hydrogen can be 
produced in a low-carbon way (such as using hydro, wind, or solar energy), but the technology is 
not yet proven in large-scale deployment. Construction began on the world’s first pilot plant in 
Sweden in 2018, which is expected to become operational soon (Energy Transitions 
Commission, 2018a, p. 13).  
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) techniques are being tested and may be feasible to reduce 
CO2 emissions during the iron production process in certain types of furnaces (Davis et al., 2018, 
p. 5; Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 62). CCS can be retrofitted to blast furnace – 
basic oxygen furnace production without significant changes to existing equipment. Experimental 
installations are being tested at scale, but the technology is not fully mature and further research 
and development are needed especially to reduce costs to the level where systems can be 
widely used (Davis et al., 2018, p. 7; Energy Transitions Commission, 2018a, p. 13). 
Biomass may be bale to replace coal as a fuel and reducing agent. This has been done in Brazil 
using charcoal produced from eucalyptus, but producing sufficient charcoal to meet demand 
would require hundreds of millions of hectares of productive land (Davis et al., 2018, p. 5). An 
alternative would be to use biogas, which is methane produced from biomass sources including 
waste decomposition, but the supply of biogas is also likely to be too limited (Energy Transitions 
Commission, 2018a, p. 13). Plastic waste has also been explored as a reducing agent in the 
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iron production process, and has been used in some European steel plants (Energy Transitions 
Commission, 2018a, p. 13). 
Electrolysis is a process that would involve reducing iron ore via direct electrolysis, which is the 
technology already extensively used in aluminium production. However, this technology is still at 
a basic research phase (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018a, p. 13). 
Other emerging technologies that have the potential to reduce carbon emissions include using 
more iron ore in pellet form rather than as sinter, since CO2 emissions for pellet production are 
lower than for sinter production; using oxy-fuel burners in electric arc furnaces to heat the scrap 
metal more uniformly; and using pulverised coal to replace some of the coke normally used in 
iron ore processing, which saves energy on the coke production process  (Pardo et al., 2012, pp. 
17–18).   
4. Captive coal 
‘Captive coal’ refers to the mining and use of coal by a company for use within that company to 
generate heat or electricity (International Energy Agency, 2017, p. 172). Captive coal is used in 
many energy-intensive industries, including the production of cement, aluminium, steel, and 
nickel, as well as electricity generation (Naik & Ghatak, 2019; Philalay, Drahos, & Thurtell, 2019; 
PwC, 2016a, p. 28, 2016b, p. 22; Shearer, Ghio, Myllyvirta, Yu, & Nace, 2016, p. 31). The term 
‘captive’ can also describe heat and power generated from industrial by-products: for example, in 
the pulp and paper industry, captive heat and power are generated from wood shavings and bark 
on site (International Energy Agency, 2017, p. 203).   
Using captive power gives a company control over its energy costs, reducing its exposure to 
fluctuations in energy and fuel prices on the open market (International Energy Agency, 2017, p. 
173). Captive power is also more reliable than electrical grid power in developing countries, and 
can allow energy-intensive industries to develop without placing a power burden on the grid or 
having to wait for extension of the grid to an industrial site (PwC, 2016b). On the other hand, 
using captive power instead of the national electrical grid deprives the grid of investment and 
undermines the economies of scale that large-scale grids can offer. In China, concerns have 
been raised that captive coal operations are not covered by the same regulations as public 
power plants, and may be built without permits and without meeting legal emissions standards 
(Shearer et al., 2016, pp. 31–32).  
In this report, approaches to reducing the use of coal, including captive coal, are covered in the 
sections on the steel and cement industries and electrical generation. However, businesses that 
have access to captive coal may find switching to lower-carbon energy sources less attractive 
than other businesses do. 
5. Shipping 
Shipping is the most energy-efficient and least carbon-intensive way to move freight (Balcombe 
et al., 2019, p. 72; Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 75; Wan, el Makhloufi, Chen, & 
Tang, 2018, p. 428). Shipping is very important to developing countries, which are major 
exporters of raw materials, and are importers and exporters of finished and semi-finished goods: 
in 2018, ports in developing countries loaded 54% and unloaded 42% of all seaborne cargo in 
the world (UNCTAD, 2019, pp. 6–8).  
9 
Most of the fuel used in shipping is heavy fuel oil, ‘a high-carbon, high-sulphur residual 
substance left over from the process of refining crude oil’ (Englert & Losos, 2020). Globally, 
international shipping is currently responsible for 3.1% of global CO2 emissions and 13% of 
sulphur oxides (Balcombe et al., 2019, p. 74), and emissions could increase by 2.5 times from 
2012 to 2050 due to increasing global freight volumes (Wan et al., 2018, p. 428). Emissions from 
shipping have been largely unregulated until recently, and major shipping nations and the 
shipping industry have been slow and reluctant to introduce measures aimed at reducing 
emissions (Balcombe et al., 2019, p. 73; Wan et al., 2018, p. 428).  
The shipping industry is likely to be one of the most expensive sectors to decarbonise (Energy 
Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 85). Change takes place slowly, partly because of the high 
cost and relatively long life of ships (the average age of the merchant fleet is 21 years) and port 
infrastructure (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 18; UNCTAD, 2019, p. 30). Adopting 
new, unproven technologies in shipping is expensive and the industry tends to be conservative 
and risk-averse (Balcombe et al., 2019, p. 80; Wan et al., 2018, p. 432). The industry is also 
fragmented, with complex contracting structures and conflicting incentives which make it difficult 
to coordinate decarbonisation efforts (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, pp. 76, 132),  
Energy efficiency measures including improved hull shapes and materials, larger ships, various 
means for reducing hull drag, more efficient on-board electrical systems, better propulsion 
systems, waste heat recovery systems, logistics improvements, and optimising routing, speed, 
and sailing practices such as ship trim, could in principle deliver significant efficiency 
improvements (Balcombe et al., 2019, pp. 80–81; Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 76; 
Wan et al., 2018, pp. 430–433). In particular, slow steaming, which simply means sailing more 
slowly, is the most promising emission-reduction strategy (Wan et al., 2018, p. 430). The 
resulting longer journey times may mean that more ships are required to maintain total transport 
capacity, but a 10% reduction in speeds could reduce total average emissions by 19% 
(Balcombe et al., 2019, p. 80). Slow steaming reduces fuel costs, but longer journeys increase 
costs for labour, insurance, and other time-related expenses, and reduce ship utilisation 
(Balcombe et al., 2019, p. 80; Wan et al., 2018, p. 430). 
Liquified natural gas (LNG) has been used as a fuel for more than 40 years as a fuel by 
vessels that transport LNG as their cargo. Engines can be retrofitted to burn LNG, but the cost of 
this can be in the millions of dollars and reduces cargo-carrying capacity (Wan et al., 2018, p. 
430). This reduces pollution in the form of nitrogen oxides, sulphur oxides, particulates, and CO2, 
but releases methane, which is a greenhouse gas, so that the net reduction in greenhouse gases 
is only 9% to 12%. Widespread transitioning to LNG fuel would also require extensive investment 
in fuelling infrastructure at ports, at considerable cost (Balcombe et al., 2019, pp. 75–77; Energy 
Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 87; Wan et al., 2018, p. 480).  
A variety of biofuels derived from agricultural products can potentially serve as alternative fuels. 
These would require only minor alterations to engines and would be largely compatible with 
existing fuelling infrastructure. However, they are expensive, potentially increasing a ship’s 
voyage cost by up to 120% (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 84). They are not 
expected to become cost-competitive with fuel oil or diesel, and large-scale production would 
lead to competition with other agricultural crops for scarce land and water resources (Balcombe 
et al., 2019, pp. 77–78). Methanol, which can be produced from natural gas, waste CO2, or 
biomass, is in use in seven ships as of 2018, but is more expensive than fossil fuels or LNG and 
there is no net climate benefit if it is produced from natural gas (Balcombe et al., 2019, p. 78). 
Ammonia is clean-burning, but only achieves a net benefit if it is produced using low-carbon 
electricity. Existing engines can be modified to use ammonia, but significant new fuelling 
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infrastructure at ports would be required. No commercial deployments have yet taken place, and 
it is forecast that the cost could add 50% to 120% to the cost of a ship’s voyage, depending on 
the cost of producing the ammonia (Balcombe et al., 2019, p. 79; Energy Transitions 
Commission, 2018b, pp. 84–86).  
Hydrogen fuel cells produce electricity with no greenhouse gas emissions at source, but the net 
benefit depends greatly on how the hydrogen is produced. The technology is not fully mature but 
fuel cells for shipping are being tested in 23 projects as of 2017, including at least two 
commercial-scale trials (Balcombe et al., 2019, p. 78).   
Batteries will likely play a role in river, coastal, and short-distance shipping, and passenger and 
car ferry traffic, but the size and weight of batteries makes them infeasible and uneconomical for 
longer journeys in the foreseeable future (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, pp. 80–82).   
Wind assistance is being tested in forms ranging from traditional sails to new types of kites, 
rotors, and turbines. It is being used to supplement to conventional engines rather than as the 
sole source of propulsion (except on heritage craft), and estimates of fuel savings vary widely. 
These deployments are experimental and cost-effectiveness has not yet been established 
(Balcombe et al., 2019, pp. 79–80).  
Solar power is used on some ships for supplementary power for onboard systems, but not for 
main propulsion. Corrosion of solar panels in the saltwater environment has been reports as a 
problem. It is in an experimental stage and cost-effectiveness has not been determined 
(Balcombe et al., 2019, p. 80). 
Some approaches to carbon capture and other exhaust gas treatment have been proposed but 
these are experimental and likely to be energy-intensive and expensive (Balcombe et al., 2019, 
p. 81). 
6. Road freight 
Road freight transport is a key contributor to economic development and integration, the 
dominant mode of transport in many regions of the world, and often the only available mode of 
freight transport for landlocked developing countries (Tanase, Kunaka, Paustian, & Philipp, 2016, 
pp. 1, 4). Road freight traffic is expected to grow significantly in developing countries; in Africa, 
for example, the amount of freight carried by road is expected to quadruple between 2015 and 
2050 (Mulholland, Teter, Cazzola, McDonald, & Ó Gallachóir, 2018, p. 687). Globally, medium 
and heavy freight trucks (gross vehicle weights of 3.5 tonnes and up) are responsible for 24% of 
greenhouse gas emissions from transport (International Energy Agency, 2017, p. 240). 
The trucking industry is decentralised and informal, dominated by small enterprises and 
individual owner-operators. In many developing countries, the sector is poorly regulated, few 
operators have formal commercial legal status, associations representing and coordinating 
operators are small and lack influence, drivers tend to be poorly trained, and many vehicles are 
obsolete or poorly maintained (Tanase et al., 2016, pp. viii, 7–8). While these features enable the 
sector to be flexible, and create economic opportunities due to relatively moderate barriers to 
entry (Tanase et al., 2016, pp. 5–7), they also make the sector difficult to engage with and 
influence for the purposes of decarbonisation. 
Electric vehicles: Globally, the Energy Transitions Commission argues that electric vehicles ‘will 
almost certainly eventually dominate’ (2018b, p. 18) because they are significantly more efficient 
than internal combustion engines. Electric trucks are likely to become cost-competitive with 
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diesel or gasoline vehicles during the 2020s and cheaper than diesel in the 2030s, first being 
used for lighter loads and shorter trips and gradually extending to larger loads and longer trips. 
Battery technology is likely to dominate short- and medium-distance trucking, while hydrogen fuel 
cells may play a role in long-distance trucking, depending on the cost of hydrogen (Energy 
Transitions Commission, 2018b, pp. 18, 79, 84; Mulholland et al., 2018, p. 687). The critical 
challenge, however – especially in a developing country context – is to ensure rapid enough 
development of electric charging infrastructure and/or hydrogen refuelling stations (Energy 
Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 86). In addition, zero-carbon electricity generation capacity 
will also be required (see section 8 below) (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 136). 
Other fuels: Truck engines can be designed, or in some cases modified, to use fuels such as 
compressed or liquid natural gas, methane from biomass or waste decomposition, biodiesel, or 
vegetable oil, possibly blended with conventional diesel, in order to reduce CO2 emissions 
(Mulholland et al., 2018, p. 685). However, although using methane derived from organic waste 
leads to a net reduction in CO2 compared with diesel, natural gas-powered and dual-fuel vehicles 
do not produce significantly less CO2 emissions (International Energy Agency, 2017, p. 246; 
Robinson, 2017; Transport & Environment, 2018, p. 26). The economic competitiveness of these 
alternative fuels is uncertain, and fuels produced from agricultural products raise concerns about 
competing for scarce land and water resources with other crops (Mulholland et al., 2018, p. 685). 
The Energy Transitions Commission argues that globally, ‘biofuels and biogas probably will not 
have a significant, long-term, cost-effective role’ (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 
120), although other authors suggest that low-carbon biofuels could have a role as a ‘bridge’ 
from current fossil-fuel infrastructure to future low-carbon fuel infrastructure’ (Mulholland et al., 
2018, p. 687). 
Shift traffic to rail or ship: Emissions from road freight transport could be reduced by diverting 
freight to rail or ship, but this option is only available where the alternative modes exist and 
infrastructure is good quality (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 74). 
Energy efficiency: Globally, technical improvements to engine and drivetrain efficiencies, 
vehicle aerodynamics, and tyre design, as well as training drivers, limiting vehicle speeds, and 
reducing vehicle weights and loads, can increase energy efficiency and reduce carbon emissions 
(Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 76; Mulholland et al., 2018, p. 684). In a developing-
country context, however, individual operators may lack the resources to upgrade their vehicles 
without assistance. 
Freight system optimisation: Globally, freight systems can in principle be made more energy 
efficient through logistical improvements such as optimising routing, platooning vehicles, and 
various approaches to increasing vehicle utilisation (Mulholland et al., 2018, pp. 684–686). 
However, these measures require close collaboration among truck operators and significant 
changes to logistics systems, which would be difficult in a fragmented industry dominated by 
individual owner-operators (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 74; Mulholland et al., 
2018, p. 684). 
7. Railway electrification 
Rail transport is already far more energy-efficient than road and air transport, and comparable to 
shipping (International Energy Agency, 2019b, pp. 47–48). Railways consume 2% of transport 
energy use worldwide while transporting 8% of passenger traffic and 7% of freight (measured by 
passenger-kilometres and tonne-kilometres) (International Energy Agency, 2019b, p. 47). 
Shifting additional freight and passenger traffic from road and air to rail could reduce CO2 
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emissions from the transport sector by up to 20% (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, pp. 
18, 74). 
Most modern trains use diesel-electric power, in which the locomotive (or, in some passenger 
trains, each powered car) uses a diesel-powered generator to feed electric motors that drive the 
train’s wheels. Electrified railways use electric power that is generated centrally and supplied to 
trains through overhead lines or third rails. Trains that can operate using both overhead electric 
power and conventional diesel-electric power are an established technology, and have the 
flexibility to travel over both electrified and non-electrified track. Trains that can switch between 
overhead electric lines and battery operation for short distances (up to 40 km) have been 
developed but are not yet commercially available, and hydrogen-powered trains are in 
experiment and testing stages (International Energy Agency, 2019b, p. 83).  
Overhead line electrification has very high capital costs, and is normally undertaken only 
where track utilisation is very high, where high-speed passenger service is required, or in urban 
light rail passenger systems. Overhead line electrification is cost-competitive with conventional 
diesel-electric operation where train frequencies are above six trains per hour for passenger 
traffic, or over two trains per hour for freight traffic (International Energy Agency, 2019b, p. 84). 
For the purposes of decarbonisation, electrification would depend on the capacity to generate 
sufficient reliable low-carbon electricity (see section 8 below). 
Battery and hydrogen fuel technologies are not currently ready for large-scale deployment.  
They could become cost-competitive for passenger trains if improvements to range and cost can 
be made, but it appears unlikely that these technologies will become cost-competitive for heavy 
freight transport (International Energy Agency, 2019b, pp. 84–85).  
8. Electricity generation: electrical grids 
Centralised electrical grids benefit from economies of scale, can supply the large quantities and 
high voltages needed by some commercial and industrial applications, are an established 
technology with tested business models and well-known institutional requirements, can integrate 
large amounts of electricity generated by renewable resources, and provide electricity at a lower 
retail price than other approaches to electrification (Morrissey, 2017, pp. 7, 26–27). ‘All countries 
that have significantly increased their electrification rates in recent years’, including China, 
Vietnam, the Philippines, and South Africa, have done so by expanding electrical grids 
(Morrissey, 2017, pp. 26–27).  
Non-carbon-emitting sources of electricity such as solar and wind power have decreased in price 
to the point where ‘cost is no longer the primary constraint to deploying renewables’ (Avila, 
Carvallo, Shaw, & Kammen, 2017, p. 38). In Brazil, India, and South Africa, for example, the cost 
of electricity generated from solar PV and wind power systems is quite competitive with natural 
gas, with solar PV costs ranging from US$47 to $168/MWh, wind ranging from US$32 to 
$96/MWh, and combined cycle gas turbines ranging from $70 to $106/MWh (Lazard, 2019, p. 9). 
In sub-Saharan Africa, solar power is growing so rapidly that investment in solar PV is expected 
to exceed investment in hydropower in 2019 (International Energy Agency, 2019a, p. 33). 
One of the principal challenges to grid expansion is the large up-front cost of extending the grid, 
especially in areas of low population density and where poverty means that power consumption 
will be low (Morrissey, 2017, p. 27). Institutional weaknesses such as poor regulation and 
management have also restricted grid development, damaged performance, and inhibited 
investment (Avila et al., 2017, pp. 32–33; Morrissey, 2017, p. 28). Thus, electrical grids are 
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poorly developed in many low-income countries. For example, sub-Saharan Africa’s electrical 
grid has a generation capacity of 0.1 kW per capita, compared with 1 to 3 kW per capita in 
wealthy countries (Avila et al., 2017, p. 29). 
The other main challenge is ensuring that electrical grids can cope with the intermittency and 
variability of solar and wind, and can rapidly change the amount of power being generated to 
match varying levels of demand (Avila et al., 2017, p. 38; Davis et al., 2018, p. 6). This requires a 
flexible and adaptive system with remote monitoring and control technologies, the ability to 
balance generation and consumption over large geographic areas and through regional 
cooperation and power sharing arrangements, and investment in ‘load-following’ electricity 
generation or storage capacity that is only used a small percentage of the time (Avila et al., 2017, 
p. 38; Davis et al., 2018, p. 6). Advanced monitoring and control systems are being retrofitted to 
existing power grids in wealthy countries, but developing countries may be able to leapfrog this 
challenge when designing and deploying new infrastructure (Avila et al., 2017, p. 38). Load-
following generation capacity is often provided by natural gas, other fossil fuels, or 
hydroelectricity, and is responsible for approximately 12% of global fossil-fuel and CO2 emissions 
(Davis et al., 2018, p. 5). The Energy Transitions Commission forecasts that it will be possible to 
provide reliable electricity at a price competitive with fossil fuels by the early 2030s using a mix of 
wind and solar, batteries, hydro, and biomass or fossil fuels with carbon capture (Energy 
Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 47).  
Natural gas power plants can change their power output rapidly and are well-suited to 
complementing intermittent wind and solar power generation in an electrical grid equipped with 
suitable sensing and control technologies without the need for additional storage (Avila et al., 
2017, p. 47) and are a well-established technology. Similar power plants operating on biomass or 
synthetic gas, with carbon capture and storage, could in principle provide load-following capacity 
with greatly reduced CO2 emissions, but the capital cost of carbon capture and storage is high 
(Davis et al., 2018, p. 6). 
Hydropower is a well-established electrical power generation technology, where geography 
provides suitable conditions. Hydropower makes up 16% of electricity generation in Africa, and 
more than half of electricity generation in sub-Saharan Africa, but there is a great deal of 
untapped potential – a study by the International Energy Agency examining 12 countries found 
sufficient capacity to produce more than eight times as much electricity from hydropower as all of 
Africa currently produces (International Energy Agency, 2019a, pp. 56, 132). There is, however, 
also a long-term risk that droughts and increased variability in rainfall due to climate change 
could reduce the performance and reliability of hydropower dams (Avila et al., 2017, p. 38). For 
example, in 2019, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe all experienced 
electricity price hikes, outages, or rationing as a result of low water levels in hydropower systems 
(International Energy Agency, 2019a, p. 63). 
Dual fuel operation: Some electricity generation plants are designed to be able to operate using 
more than one fuel, for example being able to switch between gas and oil, or gas and coal. Dual-
fuel power plants offer flexibility in case the availability of one of the fuels is insecure, the 
preferred fuel is not yet available but is expected to become available in the future, or fuel prices 
change significantly, depending on local circumstances, and can be a step in transitioning from 
one fuel to another (Faquiri, 2016; U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2019; Wärtsilä, n.d.).  
For example, a new power plant to be constructed in 2019-2020 in Cambodia will operate on 
heavy fuel oil initially with the ability to switch to liquefied natural gas when the local gas 
distribution infrastructure is complete (Akella, 2019), while a power plant to be constructed in 
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Nigeria in 2019-2020 will use natural gas as its primary fuel with the ability to switch to oil as a 
backup (Power Engineering, 2019). 
Nuclear power plants can vary their output to follow demand, but are normally operated at a 
constant high output because their high capital cost makes it important to maximise revenue 
(Davis et al., 2018, p. 6). South Africa is currently the only country in Africa using nuclear power 
(6% of generating capacity in 2018) and nuclear power is not likely to be deployed elsewhere in 
Africa in the near future (International Energy Agency, 2019a, pp. 125, 142). 
Batteries are widely used for short-term and relatively low-capacity storage, but currently 
available technologies have prohibitively high capital costs for grid-scale applications that store 
large quantities of energy and cycle infrequently. The cost of storing electricity using current 
lithium-ion battery technology can be between 4 and 14 times as expensive as generating it, 
although new technologies are being investigated, such as batteries using sulphur, that may 
have the potential to bring down costs in future (Davis et al., 2018, p. 6). 
Pumped-hydro storage: Water can be pumped from one reservoir uphill into a second reservoir 
for later release through a hydroelectric generator. This is a cost-effective and technologically 
mature option for storing large quantities of energy with high round-trip efficiency (>80%). Capital 
costs are substantial, but the cost of the generated electricity is competitive. Such systems are 
only feasible where geography provides suitably-located reservoirs and sufficient water is 
available. There can also be social and environmental opposition, and timing of water release 
can be affected by other considerations such as flood protection and agricultural needs (Avila et 
al., 2017, pp. 46–47; Davis et al., 2018, p. 6).  
Compressed air storage: Electricity can be stored by compressing air in underground rock 
formations, underwater containers, or above-ground pressure vessels. When power is required, 
the compressed air is released through a turbine, recovering 75% or more of the energy stored 
(Davis et al., 2018, p. 6). The cost of such systems is comparable to an equivalent gas-powered 
generating plant where geography permits (Avila et al., 2017, p. 47). 
Thermal storage systems store energy in large masses of material such as water tanks, bricks, 
or molten salt, or they may use other chemical transformations. They tend to have low energy 
densities, low efficiency, and high costs. ‘Thermal storage is well suited to within-day shifting of 
heating and cooling loads, but not to longer-term or larger-scale electricity generation’ (Davis et 
al., 2018, p. 7). 
Flywheel storage uses a massive wheel, spinning the wheel faster to store energy and slowing 
it to release energy (Avila et al., 2017, p. 47). This technique is fairly novel, and was used for the 
first time in a grid-connected system in 2014 in Canada although it has been used on a smaller 
scale (off-grid) in other circumstances, including a micro-grid in Marsabit, Kenya (Kenning, 2015). 
Chemical storage of energy in gas or liquid fuels includes is a flexible but currently low-
efficiency method of storage. Hydrogen, in particular, can be created through electrolysis and 
converted back to electricity in fuel cells or burned in gas turbines. Fuel cells are 40-50% efficient 
but usually rely on expensive materials as catalysts, although various substitutes are being 
explored.  Commercial-scale systems for creating and then burning hydrogen produce a round-
trip efficiency of 30% or more (Davis et al., 2018, p. 6). 
Energy efficiency and demand management techniques may be able to play a role in reducing 
grid capacity requirements and improving reliability of supply. Consumers may, for example, be 
incentivised to operate power-consuming equipment at different times of day to match generating 
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capacity, such as aiming to coincide operations with peak solar generating capacity or reduce 
power consumption when generating capacity is low (Avila et al., 2017, p. 46; Davis et al., 2018, 
p. 7). 
Carbon capture technologies under development may have a role in other industries, but due to 
dramatic reductions in the cost of renewables in the past decade, it seems unlikely that carbon 
capture will have a large role in the power sector (Energy Transitions Commission, 2018b, p. 26).  
9. Electricity generation: back-up generation and mini-
grids 
Backup generators provide power in areas where no main grid connection is available or where 
grid power is unreliable. Most backup generators are used by businesses; most households 
cannot afford them (International Energy Agency, 2019a, vols. 63, 265). Backup generators are 
fuelled by diesel oil, heavy fuel oil, or petrol and are relatively low-capacity (a few kilowatts) but 
are so widespread and so frequently necessary in Africa (for example, in Nigeria 85% of firms 
have one) that they account for approximately 8% of total electricity generation (International 
Energy Agency, 2019a, pp. 63, 265). Backup generators are noisy, contribute significantly to 
emissions of CO2 and other pollutants, and pose significant risks of fire, respiratory illnesses, and 
carbon monoxide poisoning (Avila et al., 2017, p. 32; International Energy Agency, 2019a, p. 63). 
They are inefficient and expensive, with the power they generate costing about three times the 
price of electricity from the grid (Avila et al., 2017, p. 31). 
Mini-grids3 are small-scale power generation and distribution systems located close to the point 
of consumption, and can be either independent of a centralised electricity grid or coupled to it. 
These systems are able to reach poor and remote populations relatively quickly and cheaply, 
typically use renewable energy sources and have low carbon emissions, and typically bypass 
national utilities, creating opportunities for private sector operators (Avila et al., 2017, p. 51; 
Morrissey, 2017, pp. 23–31). Although they are relatively small scale, they can generate 
sufficient electricity for commercial and industrial applications, and are modular so they can be 
expanded as demand for electricity increases (Morrissey, 2017, p. 31). Although they are usually 
stand-alone systems independent from the electricity grid, they can also be used by grid-
connected consumers to compensate for problems with grid supply (Morrissey, 2017, pp. 30–31). 
Mini-grids are typically privately owned and operated, with investment from sources including 
donors, private investors, or government sources, although some are operated by public utilities 
or use hybrid operating models (Avila et al., 2017, p. 54). 
Mini-grids most often use solar PV as their energy source, but they may incorporate wind or 
small-scale hydropower where conditions allow (Morrissey, 2017, pp. 30–31). Renewable 
sources are increasingly affordable for use due to rapid construction timelines, falling prices of 
solar and wind technologies, improving battery storage technologies, and ICTs that support 
remote operation, billing and customer services, and mobile phone payment systems (Avila et 
al., 2017, p. 54). To cope with intermittency, they are often built as hybrid systems incorporating 
natural gas, biogas, or diesel generation (Avila et al., 2017, p. 52; Morrissey, 2017, pp. 30–31) 
                                                   
3 Various authors use terms such as mini-, micro-, or nano-grids to describe systems of various sizes; the term 
‘mini-grid’ is used here for all such small-scale electricity generation and distribution systems. 
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although ‘expert advice has begun to suggest eschewing hybrid systems in favour of purely PV 
generation, despite the increased costs’ (Morrissey, 2017, p. 37).  
The initial capital cost for a mini-grid is significantly lower than for extending the main electrical 
grid, but is still a large investment for small entrepreneurs in many developing countries. Mini-
grids require storage in the form of batteries, which are expensive, they cannot take advantage of 
economies of scale, maintenance costs can be high in remote locations, and their successful 
operation requires significant economic, financial, and technical skills (Morrissey, 2017, pp. 31–
32). Thus, the retail cost of electricity from mini-grids is higher than that from the grid  (Avila et 
al., 2017, p. 54; Morrissey, 2017, p. 33). Costs can be reduced by keeping the system small at 
first and expanding incrementally, integrating residential and commercial demand, and finding a 
so-called ‘anchor tenant’ consumer that can provide a relatively secure level demand (Morrissey 
p. 35-36). 
The main challenge facing mini-grids is high regulatory uncertainty about their role in relation to 
the central grid, if and when the central grid is expanded. Investors would be more willing to 
invest if mini-grids were assured of eventually being able to connect to the central grid and serve 
a role within it, which would require a long-term regulatory framework for mini-grids (Avila et al., 
2017, p. 55). Other challenges include a lack of installers, technicians, and trainers, and the fact 
that mini-grids are a relatively new technology operating in a risky business environment with 
unknown consumer characteristics, weak institutional arrangements, non-supportive regulatory 
and policy frameworks, and limited access to finance (Morrissey, 2017, p. 34). 
Solar home systems are smaller-scale approaches to supplying electricity to individual 
households, typically in remote areas, that are too dispersed to be connected through mini-grids. 
They have limited capacity, sufficient only for lighting, ICTs, entertainment, and cooling, and 
electricity from solar home systems is more expensive than electricity from the grid or mini-grids 
(Morrissey, 2017, p. 7).  
Solar appliances and pico-solar systems are even smaller PV systems that can supply power 
for minimal-load applications (up to 10 watts) like lighting and mobile phone charging. They offer 
a replacement for light sources such as kerosene lamps and candles (Avila et al., 2017, pp. 52–
53). The cost of all of these systems has dropped over the past decade due to decreases in 
manufacturing and materials costs for PV panels, and the utility of low-power solar panels has 
increased due to improvements in energy-efficient appliances and light bulbs, particularly light-
emitting diodes (LEDs) (Avila et al., 2017, p. 53). Mobile phone banking has also facilitated 
instalment payments and pay-as-you-go business models (Avila et al., 2017, p. 53). 
The table below summarises the strengths and challenges of generating and distributing 
electricity via centralised electrical grids, mini-grids, or local off-grid systems. 
See: Strengths and challenges of four approaches to electricity generation and 
distribution, Source: Morrissey, 2017, p. 30, https://s3.amazonaws.com/oxfam-
us/www/static/media/files/oxfam-RAEL-energySSA-pt2.pdf  
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